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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

AGNES LUNDBERG,
,
Plaintiff and Appe.lZant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8896

LEGRAND P. BACKMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the
Record. The parties 'vill he referred to as they were in
the Trial Court.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal frmn an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant is a practicing attorney in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and a member of the law firm of Backman, Backman & Clark. Plaintiff employed defendant as her attorney in the defense of an action filed in the Third Judicial
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District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, entitled "Pearl J. Herridge, et al. vs. Agnes Lundberg, File X o. 100963." Plaintiff instituted the case at
bar to recover dmnages for the negligent and unskillful
1nanner in which defendant performed his services in the
defense of said quiet title action.
For a proper staten1ent of facts in this case it is
necessary to set forth the background of the quiet title
action.
The quiet title action concerned the real property
located at 1215 South 8th East Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah. Plain tiff believed that she was the owner of the
property by virtue of a warranty deed from her mother
and plaintiffs in the quiet title action claimed a two-thirds
interest in the property by virtue of a decree of distribution in their father's estate.
The plaintiffs in the quiet title action were the heirs
of Ernest J. Herridge who had been 1narried to the
nwther of the plaintiff in the case at bar. ~Ir. and :Mrs.
1-ierridge had purchased the property located at 1215
South 8th East and the title thereto was taken in their
nmnes as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.
The controversy arose concerning the rights of the parties to the property and this n1atter also concerned the
defendant LeGrand P. Backlnan.
Defendant Back1nan was the attorney for ~Ir. and
~[rs. I-Ierridge and prior to the purchase of the property
referred to above had smneone in his office prepare a
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joint will for them. The will set forth that the parties
had jointly purchased other real property in Salt Lake
and each owned an undivided one-half interest therein.
The will further provided that upon the death of either
the one-half interest of each should be divided one-third
to the surviving spouse and two-thirds to their surviving
children by previous marriages. At the time of the execution of the will Mrs. Herridge had five children, including
the plaintiff herein, and Mr. Herridge had three children,
who were later to be the plaintiffs in the quiet title action.
After the execution of the will the parties sold the
real property referred to in said will and a few years
later purchased the property located at 1215 South 8th
East, taking title as joint tenants. Mr. and Mrs. Herridge
remained in possession of the property at 1215 South 8th
East until the death of Mr. Herridge in 1940.
Defendant Backman represented Mrs. Herridge who
was the executrix of her husband's estate and the joint
will was admitted to probate. In that proceeding the
home at 1215 South 8th East Street, which was held in
joint tenancy, was erroneously included as an asset in the
estate and \vas distributed one-third to the widow and
two-thirds to the three surviving children of Mr. Herridge.
Mrs. Herridge continued living alone in the home
until plaintiff herein and her family moved in with her.
Defendant Backman continued representing plaintiff's
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mother and had numerous consultations with her pertaining to her affairs and prepared a will wherein the property located at 1215 South 8th East was set forth as belonging to her personally. On July 12, 1950, defendant
Backman, after consultation with plaintiff and plaintiff's
mother, prepared a warranty deed wherein the said property was conveyed to the plaintiff herein but reserved a
life estate in plaintiff's mother. Defendant Backman advised plaintiff and her mother that upon the death of
Mrs. Herridge the title to the property would revert to
plaintiff and there would be no need to have any will
or probate. Defendant Backman recorded the deed in
the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County
on the 13th day of July, 1950.
Plaintiff continued residing in the home and after
the death of her n1other in 1953, and upon the advice of
defendant Backman she recorded a death certificate and
was informed by defendant Backman that title to the
property was then vested in her.
Plaintiff 1nade certain improvements thereon and
was not aware of the clain1ed interest of the heirs of her
stepfather until she received a letter from one of the
heirs and their attorney demanding a partition of the
property. Upon receipt of both letters plaintiff immediately consulted with defendant Backman and was assured
by him that she was the sole owner of the property and
that the claim of the said heirs was unfounded. Defendant also advised plaintiff not to atten1pt any settlement
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5
of the matter or admit the interest of the heirs and, thereafter, on January 23, 1954, suit was instituted against
plaintiff herein to quiet title to the said property.
The pleadings of the quiet title action are included
in the record now on appeal. The pleadings disclose that
the clairn of the plaintiff heirs was based upon the interest in the property which was distributed by the decree
of distribution in the estate of Ernest J. Herridge. The
defense to the action and the basis for the counterclairn
filed therein was predicated upon the theory that plaintiff
herein was the sole owner of the property by virtue of the
warranty deed executed by her mother who was the
owner of the property.
Trial was held and a judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiff heirs and quieted their title to a twothirds interest in the property and a one-third interest
in the defendant, the plaintiff herein. The judgment further assessed the plaintiff herein reasonable rental value
from the 1st day of February 1953 to the date of trial.
A motion for a new trial was filed on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff herein, which was dismissed as not
being timely filed. The pleadings further reveal that
the defendant herein filed a withdrawal as counsel on
January 24, 1955.
The action at bar was filed to recover damages
defendant's negligence in handling the defense of
action and for failure to prepare an appeal from
judgment. The defendant Backman did not file

for
the
the
an
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answer to plaintiff's complaint, but did file a motion for
summary judgment with a supporting affidavit. Plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit which was confined to answering the matters raised in the affidavit of defendant,
and did not set forth any additional matters. Argument
was held before the trial court and defendant's motion
was granted and this appeal is from the granting of said
motion.
Before commencing with the arguments I personally
would like to state that I was employed by the Commission of the Utah State Bar Association to advise the
plaintiff in the matter. 'That in preparing the complaint
now under consideration, I felt that a fair question 'vas
presented by the pleadings and I wish to assure this court
that the action was not filed for any reason other than
doing justice between the parties. I am acquainted with
Mr. Backman and his reputation before the bench and bar
of the State, and I would not intentionally do anything
to abuse that reputation.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED DPOX
POINT I.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL.
POINT II.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
POINT III.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING
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TO APPEAL
PLAINTIFF.

THE

JUDGMENT

ENTERED

AGAINST

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL.

The rule is clear that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court's function is to determine
whether a genuine issue exists and if it does, then the
motion for summary judgment should be denied. This
rule has been stated by this Court in numerous cases.

Young, et al. v. Felornia, et al., 244 P. 2d 862; 121
U. 646, at page 648 it is stated:
"In respect to a summary judgment Rule 56
(c), U.R.C.P. provides:
'The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadingl!l, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there is any
genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion
should be denied. "
Morris v .Farnsworth Motel, 259 P. 2d 297-298:
"Under such circumstances, the party against
whom the summary judgment is granted, is entitled to the benefit of having the court consider
all of the facts presented, and every inference
fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to him; which we do in reviewing the incident."
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In Holland v. Columb~a Iron Mining Co., 293 Pac.
700; 4 U. 2d 303, the following is stated in the concurring
opinion of Justice Crockett, at page 310 :
"It is true, indeed, that a summary judgment
is a drastic remedy which the courts are, and
should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a
salutary purpose in the administration of justice
in not requiring the time, trouble and expense of
trial, when the best showing the plaintiff can
possibly claim would not entitle him to a judgment.
"Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff does not mean that the court
should pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable
to supporting plaintiff's claim and ignore those
that indicate to the contrary. It means that the
court surveys the whole picture, takes into consideration facts and inferences therefrom tending
to favor the plaintiff's position and also considers
other facts appearing which n1ust be accepted as
a matter of law, and weighs the whole matter
against the background of legal precepts bearing
on the problem. If ·when so viewed, reasonable
1ninds could make findings that would make out
a cause of action in accordance with the plaintiff'::;
claims, summary judg1nent should not be granted;
on the other hand, if it appears to the court that
reasonable 1ninds rould not make findings which
would establish a rause of action for the plaintiff, then the sununary judg1nent is proper."
Plaintiff contends that in reYiewing this 1natter in
the light n1ost favorable to plaintiff this Court will find
that there are genuine issues of fact presented and
reasonable 1ninds could find defendant was negligent.
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POINT II.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TRIAL OF THE ·CASE.

The duty of an attorney toward his client is stated
in 45 ALR 2d, 5, at page 11 as follows :
"While occasionally language may be found,
especially in the earlier cases, suggesting that an
attorney is liable to his client for the conduct of
litigation only where he is chargeable with gross
negligence or want of skill, it appears to be the
presently well-settled rule in most if not all of the
American jurisdictions in which the question has
arisen that an attorney to whom the conduct of
litigation is entrusted may be held liable to his
client for dmnages resulting from his failure to
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence, or, as it
is frequently expressed, that degree of care, skill
and diligence which is commonly possessed and
exercised by attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction.''
It is the contention of plaintiff that defendant failed
to exercise the reasonable skill and diligence of an attorney in his relationship with plaintiff, and this matter
presents a genuine issue of fact. Plaintiff further contends that the record now before this Court substantiates
this position.

Plaintiff alleged in the third paragraph of the First
Cause of Action of the Complaint that defendant was unskillful and negligent in the conduct of the case. This
allegation of negligence places in issue the entire conduct of defendant Backman in advising, preparing and
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conducting the trial of the case he was employed to defend. The defendant did not file an answer to the Complaint. We submit that without this pleading the issues
raised by the allegations in the complaint are still present
and are genuine issues of fact.
Even though the defendant failed to deny the allegations of the Complaint, the averments by defendant in his
affidavit present genuine issues of fact.
The affidavit defendant filed in support of his motion for summary judgment presented to the court an
outline of his actions as an attorney in advising plaintiff, in preparing the defense of the case, and included
an incomplete statement concerning the background of
the title to the property involved. The affidavit of defendant is completely without any assertion by him that
before advising plaintiff or preparing the defense of the
quiet title action he examined the records and files in his
own office pertaining to the estate of Ernest J. Herridge.
It is the contention of plaintiff that this failure of defendant to examine the files of his office presents a genuine
issue of fact fron1 which reasonable minds may conclude
that he was negligent.
We sub1nit that this contention is logically sound.
If defendant had exmnined the files in his office his
me1nory would have been refreshed and he would have
known that the asserted clailn by the heirs of Ernest J.
}{erridge 1nust naturally be based upon the Decree of
Distribution entered in his estate. Defendant's recollection would haYe been refreshed and he would have lmown
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that he had erroneously included the property involved
in the controversy in the estate of Ernest J. Herridge
;wtl that the deed fron1 plaintiff's mother did not convey
a fee simple title to the property. With this valuabk
information defendant could have attempted to rectify
his mistake and if this were impossible he would have
been in a position to advise plaintiff herein that the
n~serted claiu1s were valid and unimpeachable and that
it was in1possible for him to e1iminate their interest in
the property.
Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and
diligence and advised plaintiff herein that the asserted
claims by the heirs were unfounded and she was the sole
and exclusive owner of the property by virtue of the
warranty deed from her mother.
This matter is material because evidence will be
introduced that the heirs approached plaintiff for a
settlement of their claims. The evidence will be that the
heirs were willing to accept as settlement of their case
the sun1 of $1,000.00 each and in consideration of this
payment ·would convey their interests in the property
to plaintiff. Evidence will also be introduced that defendant was aware of this offer and advised plaintiff not
to make any settlement.
Plaintiff submits that by not settling the case for
the sum of $3,000.00 she did not obtain the two-thirds
interest in the home which had a value of $5,200.00.
Plaintiff further submits that a judgment in the sum of
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$1,026.74 was assessed against her one-third interest for
rent which resulted in her being damaged in a total
amount of approximately $3,226.74.
The failure of defendant to use ordinary skill and
diligence in appraising himself of the basis of the asserted claims against his clients property, prevented him
from discovering that the decree of distribution in the
Ernest J. Herridge estate was not in accordance with
the provisions of his will. Evidence will be introduced
that the joint will of Mr. and Mrs. Herridge recited that
each had invested 1noney in the purchase of the real property then in their possession and that each owned a onehalf interest in said property. The will then recited that
the distribution of the one-half interest of the deceased would be one-third to the surviving spouse and
two-thirds to the surviving children. The decree of distribution did not make this distinction and we submit
this matter could have been modified prior to the quiet
title action. This would not have altered the judgment
rendered in the quiet title action, but ·would have assured
that plaintiff would have reeeiYed a greater interest in
the property.
The affidavit of defendant states that his theory
of the defense to the quiet title action was developed
in good faith and an honest belief that his theory \n1s
well founded. The affidavit further avers that he resorted to the onl~r defense that was open to hun or would
have been open to any well inforn1ed h1\\·yer. Plaii1tiff
respertfull:· sub1nits that the faiure of defendant to fully
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appraise himself of the basis of the alleged claim to a
two-thirds interest in his client's property makes this
a genuine issue of fact.
Plaintiff submits that the matters presented herein
establish there is a genuine issue of fact in this case
and reasonable 1ninds could find that defendant Backman did not use reasonable skill and diligence in the defense of this case.
POINT III.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING
TO APPEAL THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
PLAINTIFF.

The second cause of action is based upon the theory
that defendant was negligent in failing to perfect an
appeal from the judgment to the Supreme ·Court of the
State of Utah. The allegations place in issue the actions
of defendant after the trial of the case.
The affidavit of defendant avers he ·withdrew as
counsel for plaintiff on December 1, 1954, which was in
ample time for her to secure other counsel. We submit
that a genuine issue of fact is presented in that the record
now before this Court establishes that this withdrawal
was not filed with the Clerk of the Court until the 24th
day of January, 1955, when the time for filing a notice
of appeal had expired. The record discloses that while
the affidavit of defendant avers the withdrawal on December 1, 1954, defendant filed a motion for new trial
dated Decmnber 3, 1954.
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Plaintiff contends the date of withdrawal is material
because if an appeal could have been perfected in time
the judgment entered by the court would have· been reversed. Plaintiff contends that the finding by the trial
court that plaintiff herein should be assessed rent from
February 1, 1953, ·was reversible error. The trial court
committed reversible error in failing to find that plaintiff was entitled to credit for taxes and in1provements
made on the property.
We respectfully submit that this conduct of defendant presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether he
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
CONCL"CSION
We respectfully submit that the smnmary judgment
of dis1nissal should be reversed and the case remanded
to the trial court in order that the parties may present
fully the evidence from live witnesses on the stand to a
tribunal that may then determine the factual issues involved and render a verdict and judg1nent based upon
that determination.
Respectfully subn1itted,
RICIL\RD

c.

DIBBLEE

Attorney for Appellant

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City. lTtah
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